Abstract. We analyze the situation where computationally binding string commitment schemes are used to force the receiver of a BB84 encoding of a classical bitstring to measure upon reception. Since measuring induces an irreversible collapse to the received quantum state, even given extra information after the measurement does not allow the receiver to evaluate reliably some predicates apply to the classical bits encoded in the state. This fundamental quantum primitive is called quantum measure commitment (QMC) and allows for secure two-party computation of classical functions. An adversary to QMC is one that can both provide valid proof of having measured the received states while still able to evaluate a predicate applied to the classical content of the encoding. We give the first quantum black-box reduction for the security of QMC to the binding property of the string commitment. We characterize a class of quantum adversaries against QMC that can be transformed into adversaries against a weak form for the binding property of the string commitment. Our result provides a construction for 1 − 2-oblivious transfer that is computationally secure against the receiver and unconditionally secure against the sender from any string commitment scheme satisfying a weak binding property. keywords: quantum bit commitment, oblivious transfer, quantum measurement, computational assumptions.
Introduction
As in the classical case, secure quantum 2-party cryptography must rely upon assumptions but the two models do not share the same capabilities and limits. In particular, given a classical black-box for bit commitment, there exists a quantum protocol, called the BBCS protocol [4] , achieving 1 − 2 oblivious transfer [7, 6, 22] (one-out-of-two oblivious transfer). This is in sharp contrast with the classical case where such a reduction is not only unknown but unlikely to exist [12] . The difference between the two models can intuitively be appreciated by observing that a classical black-box for bit commitment allows to transform the quantum channel into a noisy classical channel powerful enough to provide OT. To see this, consider the BB84 coding scheme [2, 4] for classical bit b into a random state in { b + , b × }.The random θ ∈ {+, ×} used to encode b into the quantum state b θ , is called the transmission basis for b.Since only orthogonal quantum states can be distinguished with certainty, the transmitted bit b is not received perfectly by the receiver, Alice, who does not know the transmission basis. The coding scheme also specifies what an honest Alice should be doing with the received state b θ . She pickŝ θ ∈ R {+, ×} and measures b θ with measurement Mθ that distinguishes perfectly orthogonal states 0 θ and 1 θ , providing the classical outcomê b ∈ {0, 1}. If Bob and Alice follow honestly the BB84 coding scheme then b is received with probability 1 whenθ = θ whereas a random bit is received whenθ = θ. The error-rate of such a transmission is therefore 1 4 when θ is not revealed to Alice. Dishonest Bob however, could send different states in order to temper with the error-rate of the channel so it becomes an unfair noisy channel (i.e. UNC) [9] . Bob could instead send cos 8 . According to [9] , the resulting (sin . In order to prevent Bob from behaving in such way, a slightly different strategy is used. Bob is now asked to announce θ allowing Alice to determine whether b has been received. The result is an oblivious transfer of bit b from Bob to Alice only assuming Alice is honest. Dishonest Alice can easily learn b all the time by waiting for θ before applying measurement Mθ. Bob must make sure that Alice has measured before the announcement of θ so the initial state has collapsed irreversibly. An oblivious transfer is possible only given such a primitive. The natural way to build used commitments [4] .
We call Quantum Measure Commitment (or QMC) the primitive that allows Alice to provide Bob with evidences that she measured the qubits received before the announcement of θ. Implementing a QMC is simply done by sending a commitment containing (θ,b) to Bob. A collapse occurred if given the transmission basis θ, the bit b cannot be determined perfectly. However, verifying the collapse of a single qubit cannot be done perfectly since Alice could always provide a commitment to random (θ,b) while keeping b θ untouched until θ is announced. The probability of opening with success would then be 3 4 while b can always be received perfectly from θ. To avoid a lucky Alice from learning too much about b, QMC are made to n random BB84 qubits b θ = b 1 θ 1 , b 2 θ 2 , . . . , b n θn before Bob announces the transmission basis θ = θ 1 , . . . , θ n . The QMC is simply a string commitment containing the measurementsθ ∈ {+, ×} n and the outcomesb ∈ {0, 1} n . The classical transmission is encoded in some predicate f (b 1 , . . . , b n ). Alice should be unable to evaluate f (b 1 , . . . , b n ) even given the knowledge of θ. The BBCS protocol can be seen as a reduction of oblivious transfer to such a QMC to n random BB84 qubits with f (b 1 , . . . , b n ) ≡ ⊕ n i=1 b i . A QMC is therefore an universal primitive for secure quantum 2-party computation of classical functions. A successful adversary to QMC is one that can unveil valid measurement outcomes with good probability while being able to get a bias on f (b 1 , . . . , b n ) given θ ∈ {+, ×} n .
In this paper, we address the question of determining how the binding property of the string commitment scheme used for implementing a QMC enforces its security. As already pointed out in [10, 8] , quantum bit commitment schemes satisfy different binding properties than classical ones. The difference becomes more obvious when string commitments are taken into account. We generalize the computational binding criteria of [10] to the case where commitments are made to strings of size l(n) ∈ Ω(n) for n the security parameter. Intuitively, for a class of functions F ⊆ {f : {0, 1} l(n) → {0, 1} m(n) }, we say that a string commitment scheme is F -binding if for all f ∈ F and given y ∈ R {0, 1} m(n) , the committer cannot open with success any s ∈ {0, 1} l(n) such that f (s) = y. The smaller m(n) is compared to l(n), the weaker is the F -binding criteria. We relate the security of a QMC to a weak form of the F -binding property. Assume QMC's are made using some computationally binding string commitments containing the basesθ ∈ {+, ×} n and the resultŝ b ∈ {0, 1} n obtained by Alice after Bob's transmission of b θ . At this point, Bob selects a challenge c ∈ R {0, 1}. If c = 0, Alice unveils all measurements and outcomes that Bob verifies. If c = 1, Bob announces the transmission basis θ ∈ R {+, ×} n and Alice tries to get a bias on the parity of b. Letp s be Alice's probability of success when c = 0 and let be Alice's expected bias when c = 1. Our main contribution describes howp s and˜ relates to the F n m(n) -binding criteria of the string commitment where F n m(n) is a class of functions with m(n) ∈ O(polylog(n)). We give a black-box reduction of any good quantum adversary against QMC into one against the F n m(n) -binding property of the string commitment. We show that ifp s + 4˜ 2 ≥ 1 + δ(n) for non-negligible δ(n), then the string commitment is not F n m(n) -binding. Our reduction shows that using computationally binding commitments one can enforce a computational collapse of quantum information. This is the first quantum black-box reduction linking the security of those two primitives. Previously, Yao [22] has shown that if the string commitment is modeled by a classical blackbox then the BBCS protocol is secure. Our result can be used for proving the security of OT in the computational setting using a different approach. We describe a 1 − 2 oblivious transfer unconditionally secure against the sender but computationally secure against the receiver that is very similar to the BBCS protocol. It is shown that any dishonest receiver able to get a non-negligible amount of information about each transmitted bit can break the F n m(n) -binding property of the string commitment used in the construction. As for the Quantum Goldreich-Levin theorem of [1] and the computationally binding commitments of [10] and [8] , our result clearly indicates that 2-party quantum cryptography in the computational setting can be based upon different assumptions (i.e. weaker to some extend) than its classical counterpart.
Preliminaries
Notations and Tools. In the following, poly(n) stands for any polynomial in n. We write A(n) < poly(n) for "A(n) is smaller than any polynomial provided n is sufficiently large" and A(n) ≤ poly(n) (resp. A(n) ≥ poly(n)) means that A(n) is upper bounded by some polynomial (resp. lower bounded by some polynomial). For w ∈ {0, 1} n , x w means that x i = 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that w i = 0 (x belongs to the support of w). We denote by " " the string concatenation operator. For w ∈ {0, 1} n , we write [w] ≡ ⊕ n i=1 w i . For w, z ∈ {0, 1} n , we write |w| for the Hamming weight of w, ∆(w, z) = |w ⊕ z| for the Hamming distance, and w z ≡ ⊕ n i=1 w i · z i is the boolean inner product. Notation u denotes the Euclidean norm of u and u † denotes its complex conjugate transposed. The following well-known identity will be useful,
Next lemma, proved in Appendix A, provides a useful generalization of the parallelogram identity: 
Then,
Finally, for θ, b ∈ {0, 1} n , we define
Quantum Operators and Encoding. In the following, we denote the m-dimensional Hilbert space by H m . The basis { 0 , 1 } denotes the computational or rectilinear or "+" basis for H 2 . When the context requires, we write b + to denote the bit b in the rectilinear basis. The diagonal basis, denoted "×", is defined as { 0 × , 1 × } where In the following, we write P +,0 ≡ P 0 = 0 0 , P +,1 ≡ P 1 = 1 1 , P ×,0 = 0 × 0 and P ×,1 = 1 × 1 for the projections along the four BB84 states. The two possible measurements applied by the receiver of BB84 qubits are
In order to simplify the notation, we sometimes associate the rectilinear basis "+" with bit 0 and the diagonal basis with bit 1. We map sequences of rectilinear and diagonal bases into bitstring the obvious way. Model of Computation and Protocols. In this paper, we model protocols and algorithms by quantum circuits built out of the universal set of quantum gates UG = {CNot, H, P, T}, where CNot denotes the controllednot, H the one qubit Hadamard gate, P the phase gate, and T is a one qubit gate sometimes refer to as the π/8 gate [19] .In addition to the set of gates UG, a quantum circuit is allowed to perform von Neumann measurements in the computational basis M + . A circuit C executed in the reverse direction is denoted C † . The complexity of the circuit C is simply the number C UG of elementary gates in UG contained in C.
In the following, we use the two Pauli (unitary) transformations σ X (bit flip) and σ Z (conditional phase shift) defined for b ∈ {0, 1} as,
Assuming U is a one qubit operation and s ∈ {0, 1} n , we write
U ⊗s is therefore a conditional application of U on each of n registers depending upon the value of s. The maximally entangled state Φ + n = 2 −n/2 x∈{0,1} n x ⊗ x will be useful in our reduction. This state can easily be constructed from (scratch) 0 n L ⊗ 0 n R after applying n Hadamard H and CNOT gates. A 2-party quantum protocol taking place between A and B is a pair of interactive quantum circuits (P A , P B ) applied to some initial product state
representing A's and B's (maybe secret) inputs to the protocol neglecting to write explicitly the states of A's and B's registers that do not encode their respective input to the protocol (thus all in initial states 0 ). Since communication takes place between A and B, the complete circuit representing one protocol execution may have quantum gates in P A and P B acting upon the same quantum registers. We write P A P B for the complete quantum circuit when A is interacting with B. The final composite state Ψ final obtained after the execution is then written as
. Protocols are to be understood, although not always explicitly stated, as specified by families of interactive quantum circuits, one for each possible value of the security parameter n. We denote by P AB = {(P A n , P B n )} n>0 such a family of protocols.
Definitions

Computationally Binding Quantum String Commitment
In the following we shall always refer to A as the sender and B as the receiver of some commitment. Such a scheme can be specified by two families of protocols 
In [10] , the security criteria for computationally binding but otherwise concealing quantum bit commitment schemes were introduced. Here, we follow a similar approach for string commitment schemes.
An 
s is B's projection operator on the subspace leading to accept the opening of s. The main difference between quantum and classical commitments is the impossibility in the quantum case to fix the adversary's committed string s after the committing phase of the protocol has been executed. Classically, this can be done by fixing the adversary's random tape so any s = s cannot be unveiled with non-negligible probability. In addition, techniques like rewinding have no quantum counterpart [20] . A committer (to a concealing commitment) can always commit upon any superposition of values for s that will remain such until the opening phase. Even an honest committer does not necessarily know a single string that can be unveiled with non-negligible probability of success. Suppose a quantum l(n)-string commitment scheme has
If the committer starts with superposition
, then the state obtained after the committing phase would be:
Equation (4) is a valid commitment to a superposition of strings that will always allow the sender to open s with probabilityp s (n). The honest strategy described in (4) achieves sp s (n) = 1. In [10] , the binding condition is satisfied if no adversary can do significantly better than what is achievable by (4) in the special case where l(n) = 1. More precisely, a bit commitment scheme is binding if for all adversariesÃ:
wherep b (n) is the probability to open bit b with success. Extending this definition to the case where l(n) ∈ Ω(n) must be done with care however. The obvious generalization of (5) to the requirement s∈{0,
) for all strings s ∈ {0, 1} n then the polytime adversaryÃ is indistinguishable from what is achievable with the honest state (4) resulting from distribution {(2 −n , s)} s . Any attack that cannot be distinguished from the honest behaviour in polynomial time should hardly be considered successful. On the other hand, defining a successful adversaryÃ as one who can open s and s (s = s ) such thatp s (n) +p s (n) ≥ 1 + 1/p(n) is in general too weak when one tries to reduce the security of a protocol to the security of the string commitment used by that protocol (as we shall see for QMCs). Breaking a protocol could be reduced to breaking the string commitment scheme in a more subtle way. In general, the possibility to commit upon several strings in superposition can be used by the adversary to make his attack against the binding condition even more peculiar. Instead of trying to open a particular string s ∈ {0, 1} l(n) , an attacker could be interested in opening any s ∈ {0,
We shall see in the following that the security of QMC is guaranteed provided the string commitment does not allow the committer to mount such an attack for a special class of functions. Such an adversary is characterized by a family of interactive quantum circuitsÃ
B is the state generated during the committing phase of the protocol andψ(y)
Aψ AB is the state (hopefully) allowing to open s ∈ {0, 1} l(n) such that f (s) = y. The probability to succeed in opening such an s is,
where Q B s is B's projector operator leading to accept the opening of s ∈ {0, 1} l(n) . The following security criteria takes into account a class of functions for which the binding condition is guaranteed: (6) .
Note that any standard attack can be expressed in terms of an appropriate class of functions F . In general, the smaller m(n) is with respect to l(n), the weaker is the F -binding requirement. A class of functions of particular interest is built out of s 1 (x, y) = x, s 2 (x, y) = y, and s 3 (x, y) = x ⊕ y for all x, y ∈ {0, 1}. Let I n m(n) be the set of subsets of {1, . . . , n} having size exactly m(n), we define the class of functions F n m(n) as,
where
In other words, F n m(n) contains the set of functions f : {0,
is a set of m(n) bits where each is either in x or in y or in x ⊕ y.
Quantum Measure Commitment
Quantum Measure Commitment (QMC) is a primitive allowing the receiver of random qubits to show the sender that the qubits have been measured without disclosing any further information about the measurement and the outcome. In this paper we restrict our attention to quantum transmission of random BB84 qubits. The measurements performed by the receiver are for each transmission independently chosen in {M + , M × }. For simplicity we model QMCs by the following game between players A and B:
1. B sends n random BB84 qubits in state b θ for b ∈ R {0, 1} n and θ ∈ R {+, ×} n , 2. A measures the qubits with measurement Mθ forθ ∈ R {+, ×} n thus and producing the classical outcomeb ∈ {0, 1} n , 3. A uses a 2n-string commitment and commits to A wants to maximize both her success probability when unveiling and the bias on [b] whenever θ is announced. This is almost identical to the receiver's situation in the BBCS protocol [4] . Since we only consider unconditionally concealing string commitments, B gets information about A's measurements and results only if they are unveiled.
We model the adversaryÃ by a family of interactive quantum circuitsÃ = {(C A n ,Õ A n ,Ẽ n )} n>0 whereC A n andÕ A n areÃ's circuits for the committing and the opening (c=0) phases. CircuitẼ n allows to extract the parity of b upon the announcement of basis θ. CircuitC A n works upoñ A's internal registers H A together with the register H channel (the channel) carrying the BB84 qubits. We denote by
the resulting state after the committing phase (step 3). This state should allowÃ to succeed both challenges with good probability. By linearity, we have that for all θ, b, x ∈ {0, 1} n ,
The probability to open with successp ok (θ,b) (n), when b θ was sent, is
the projection operator applied upon B's registers and leading to a valid opening of (θ,b) ∈ {0, 1} 2n . The opening of (θ,b) is accepted by
so the opening process can be seen as a sin-
. The expected probability of
When c = 1,Ã should be able, given the announcement of θ, to extract information about the parity [b] .The extractorẼ n has access to an extra register H Θ that contains the basis θ ∈ {+, ×} n . The extractor stores the guess for [b] in register H ⊕ . The biasε θ,b (n) provided by the extractor when the qubits were initially in state b θ is
is applied upon the output register H ⊕ . The expected valuẽ ε(n) for the bias provided byẼ n is,
We characterizeÃ's behaviour against QMC usingp ok (n) andε(n). Independently of the string commitment scheme used, there always exists A * preparing a superposition of attacks that 1) provides [b] with certainty and 2) succeeds with probability 1 during the opening. Such an attack can be implemented as follows:
where |α| 2 + |β| 2 = 1 and C A n and C B n are the honest circuits for committing. The state ψ * θ,b is a superposition of the honest behaviour with probability |α| 2 and the trivial attack consisting in not measuring the BB84 qubits received with probability |β| 2 . The expected probability of success p * (n) is
since with probability |α| 2 an honest QMC was executed and with probability |β| 2 a QMC to the fixed state 0 n θ was made. In the later case, the probability to pass B's test is (3/4) n . The expected bias satisfies
since with probability |α| 2 a QMC to b θ is recovered (in which case a nonzero bias on [b] occurs only whenθ = θ) and with probability |β| 2 a QMC to a dummy value is made allowing to extract [b] perfectly. Such an attack does not enable the committer to break the binding property of the string commitment but achieves: p * (n)+2ε * (n) > 1. We define two flavors of adversaries against QMC. The first flavor captures any adversary that achieves anything better than the trivial adversaryÃ * defined in (15) . The second flavor captures stronger adversaries for which our reduction will be shown to produce attacks against the F n m(n) -binding property of the string commitment. (12) and (14) respectively. is perfect. We construct a circuit built fromÃ that allows to prepare a commitment from which any ψ θ,b can be generated efficiently during the opening phase. In Sect. 5, we shall use the resulting circuit, called the switching circuit, to provide an attack against the binding property of string commitment.
The Switching Circuit
Instead of runningC n ≡ (C A n C B n ) upon some BB84 qubits, we run it with the maximally entangled state Φ + n where the first half is stored in H Θ and the second half stored in H Q . Therefore, the basis given as input to the extractor is not a classical state but is rather entangled with register H Q containing the qubitsÃ is committed upon. After the execution of C n Φ + n Θ,Q , transformations B ⊗b and T ⊗θ are applied to register H Θ in order to prepare the input for the extractor where, B = σ X σ Z and T = H σ Z .Ẽ n is then run before σ Z is applied upon the extractor's output register H ⊕ . The transformation is completed by running the extractor in reverse. The following circuit is called the switching circuit:
Next, we see that whenever the parity extractor is perfect (i.e.Ẽ n ≡ E n ), the switching circuit using transformations B ⊗b and T ⊗θ generates ψ θ,b . To see this, we follow its evolution from the initial state Φ + n . We first look at the state generated before the extractor is applied,
The intermediary states up to (19) are obtained by definition of Φ + n ,C n , B ⊗b , and T ⊗θ . Equation (20) follows after changing the basis from + n to b ⊕ s ⊕ t using (10) . From (20), we follow the evolution
Equation (22) follows from the fact that the extractor is perfect. Equation (23) follows after using (1). We finally get (24) from (10).
In conclusion, a perfect extractor allows to produce a commitment inside which any ψ θ,b can be put efficiently during the opening phase.
Analysis
We analyze the switching circuit when it is run with imperfect parity extractors. We first show how states {Ψ θ,b } θ,b , produced in this case, overlap with states { Ψ θ,b } θ,b generated when perfect extractors are available.
In Sect. 5.2, we represent the behaviour of the switching circuit by a table.In Sect. 5.3, we relate the table representation to attacks against the F n m(n) -binding property of the string commitment.
Generalization to Imperfect Extractors
Assume the adversaryÃ = {(C A n ,Õ A n ,Ẽ n )} n>0 has access to an imperfect extractor.Ẽ n modeled as follows:
Without loss of generality, we may assume that both γ θ,b andγ θ,b are real positive numbers such that |γ θ,b | 2 ≥ 1 2 (i.e. arbitrary phases can be added to ϕ θ,b andφ θ,b ). According (14) , the expected bias provided byẼ n is,ε
Compared to the case where the extractor is perfect, only the effect of transformationẼ † n σ ZẼn needs to be recalculated. From (25), we obtain,
We now define the vector e θ,b such that
so that (27) becomes
The final stateΨ θ,b produced by the switching circuit can be obtained from (22) using (28). We get,
Splitting the inner sum of (29) gives,
θ ⊕ x ψ θ⊕x,b⊕y , and
is exactly what one gets when the switching circuit is run with a perfect extractor (see (24)). The second part is the error term for which next lemma gives a precise characterization.
be the adversary from which we build the switching circuit. Then,
Proof. Let θ be fixed. Using the definition of F θ,b , we get 
where (32) 
The result follows after replacing (33) in (32).
Using Lemma 2, we show how the the output of the switching circuit with imperfect extractors approaches the one with perfect extractors. The next lemma gives an upper bound on the expected overlap between the states produced in the two cases.
be the circuits for the adversary such that the extractorẼ n has expected biasε(n). Then, the set of states {Ψ θ,b } b,θ produced by the switching circuit satisfies,
Proof. According (30), we can writeΨ
Using (34) and Lemma 2 gives,
Lemma 3 tells us that with a good extractor, one can generate states having large overlap with all QMCs to different BB84 qubits after the end of the committing stage.
Representing The Switching Circuit by a Table
In this section, we look at how to use the switching circuit in order to obtain an attack against the binding condition of the string commitment.
open a valid QMC to b θ where Q * (θ,b) is defined as in (11) . Remember that a valid opening of b θ consists in the opening of any 2n-bit string 
While for perfect extractors the sum over all elements in the table is at least 4 npok (n), next theorem shows that any table TÃ built from a δ(n)-good adversaryÃ adds up to 4 n poly(δ(n)). The proof is a consequence of Lemma 3 and can be found in Appendix B.
Theorem 1 establishes the existence of one column in table TÃ providing a weak attack against the binding property since any table with 3 n columns all summing up to more than 4 n δ(n) 3 32 has one column exceeding ( 2 3 ) n δ(n) 2 32 ≥ 1 + 1/poly(n). Let (τ, β) be such a column and consider the class of functions 1 2n containing only the identity. For (y, y ) ∈ {0, 1} 2n , the stateΨ y⊕τ,y ⊕β can be generated using the switching circuit. The probability to unveil (y, y ) is T y⊕τ,y ⊕β (τ, β) = Q B (y,y )Ψ y⊕τ,y ⊕β 2 .
By construction, we have
(n) = (y,y ) T y⊕τ,y ⊕β (τ, β) > 1 + 1/poly(n) which provides an attack against the 1 2n -binding property of string commitment according (7). As we have seen in Sect. 3.1 however, this attack might not even be statistically distinguishable from the trivial adversary. In the next section, we find stronger attacks allowing to relax the binding property required for secure QMC.
Strong Attacks Against the String Commitment
We now show that the table TÃ, built out of any δ(n)-good adversaryÃ, contains an attack against the F n m(n) -binding property of the 2n-string commitment with m(n) ∈ O(polylog(n)) whenever δ(n) ≥ 1/poly(n). We show this using a counting argument. We cover uniformly the table TÃ with all attacks in F n m(n) . Theorem 1 is then invoked in order to conclude that for some f ∈ F n m(n) , condition (7) does not hold.
Attacking the binding condition according to a function f ∈ F n m(n)
is done by grouping columns in TÃ as described in (6) and discussed in more details in Appendix C. The number of lines involved in such an attack is clearly 2 m(n) while the number of columns can be shown to be 2 m(n) 3 n−m(n) (see Appendix C and Lemma 4). This means that any attack in F n m(n) covers t = 3 n−m(n) 4 m(n) elements in TÃ. The quality of such an attack is characterized by the sum of all elements in the sub-array defined by the attack since this sum corresponds to the value of (7). Let tÃ = 3 n 4 n be the total number of elements in TÃ and let sÃ be its sum. The following lemma, proved in Appendix D, shows that the attacks in F n m(n) covers TÃ uniformly:
Let s * be the maximum of (7) for all attacks f ∈ F n m(n) . Clearly, a · s * ≥ a·t·sÃ tÃ since by Lemma 4, the covering of TÃ by f ∈ F n m(n) is uniform and a · t/tÃ is the number of times TÃ is generated by attacks in F n m(n) . In other words,
Assuming thatÃ is δ(n)-good, Theorem 1 tells us that sÃ ≥
32 . Replacing in (37) finally leads to,
for any m(n) ≥ log 4 3 32 δ(n) 3 . Equation (38) guarantees that for at least one f ∈ F n m(n) , condition (7) is not satisfied thereby providing an attack against the F n m(n) -binding property of the string commitment. Moreover, for δ(n) ≥ 1/poly(n) it is sufficient that m(n) ∈ O(polylog(n)).
The Main Result and Its Application to Oblivious Transfer
Putting together Theorem 1 and (38) leads to our main result:
Theorem 2 (Main). Any δ(n)-good adversaryÃ against QMC can break the F n m(n) -binding property of the string commitment it is built upon for m(n)
Theorem 2 has an immediate application to the security of 1 − 2-OT in the computational setting. We can easily observe that a QMC implements a weak 1 − 2 oblivious transfer (i.e. WOT) where 1)the sender has no information about the receiver's selection bit and 2)the receiver, according Theorem 2, can only extract a limited amount of information about both bits (provided the string commitments are F n m(n) -binding). The following primitive, called W n , accepts B's input bits (β 0 , β 1 ) and A's selection bit s and builds a WOT from a QMC:
Protocol W n 1. B and A run the committing phase of a QMC (i.e. built upon any F n m(n) -binding string commitment scheme) upon b θ for b ∈ R {0, 1} n , θ ∈ R {+, ×} n picked by B, 2. B chooses c ∈ R {0, 1} and announces it to A, -if c = 0 then A unveils the QMC, if ok then A and B return to 1 otherwise B aborts,
Clearly, W n is a correct 1−2 OT since an honest receiver A can always get bit β s = b s ⊕a s by announcing I s such that for all i ∈ I s the measurements were made in basisθ i = θ i . The adversaryÃ's information about the other bit can be further reduced using the following simple protocol accepting B's input bits (β 0 , β 1 ) and the selection bit s for the honest receiver:
Protocol R-Reduce(t, W)
1. W is executed t times, with inputs (β 0i , β 1i ), i = 1..t for the sender and input s for the receiver where
The receiver computes the XOR of all bits received, that is
Classically, it is straightforward to see that the receiver's information about one-out-of-two bit decreases exponentially in t. We say that a quantum adversaryÃ against R-Reduce(t, W n ) is promising if it runs in polytime and the probability to complete the execution is non-negligible. Using Theorem 2, it is not difficult to show thatÃ's information about one of the transmitted bits also decreases exponentially in t wheneverÃ is promising:
Theorem 3. For any promising receiverÃ in R-Reduce(t, W n ) and for all executions, there existss ∈ {0, 1} such thatÃ's expected bias on βs is negligible in t.
A sketch of proof can be found in Appendix E. It relies upon the fact that any promising adversary must run almost all W n withp ok (n) > 1 − δ for any δ > 0. Using Theorem 2, this means that independently for each of those executions 1 ≤ i ≤ t, one bit βs i out of (β 0i , β 1i ) cannot be guessed with bias better than ε max (δ) < 1. In this case, the guessing probability for the parity of the t random bits can be shown to approach Clearly, the sender B in R-Reduce(t, W n ) cannot get any non-negligible amount of information about A's selection bit when the commitments are statistically concealing. This remark together with Theorem 3 and the correctness of R-Reduce(t, W n ) lead to: In other words, basing the security of 1 − 2-OT upon Theorem 2 allows for a simple proof of security in the computational setting. Note that for simplicity, we assumed an error-free quantum channel.
Conclusion and Open Questions
Our first open question is whether or not Theorem 2 holds for δ(n)-non-trivial adversaries against QMC. Such an extension would show that our reduction from an adversary to QMC into one against the binding condition is optimal. It is also of interest to find attacks against weaker binding properties. In particular, is it possible to transform an adversary against QMC into one against the F -binding property where F is class of functions with range of size in o(log 1/δ(n))? Our transformation of an adversary against QMC to one against the binding condition is nonuniform since we did not provide an efficient way to find an f -attack against the binding property. Our result would be stronger if a uniform reduction was found. It is also an interesting problem to show that the computationally binding bit commitments of [10] and [8] can be turned the obvious way into F n m(n) -binding string commitments. This would show that QMCs and therefore OT can be based upon any one-way permutation from [10] and upon any one-way function from [8] . Recent work of Mayers [18] seems to indicate that it is indeed the case for [10] .
Finally, it would be of great interest to formally proof the security of the BBCS protocol using Theorem 2. This would result in a proof of security that, in addition to apply in the computational setting, would be based upon a completely different approach than Yao's original proof [22] . It is also an interesting problem to proof Corollary 1 in the case where the quantum channel is not error-free.
SinceÃ is δ(n)-good, we use (43) to conclude that the set
32 .
C Implementing an f -attack From the Switching Circuit
In this appendix, we briefly describe how one can use the switching circuit in order to attack the binding property of the string commitment relative to some function f ∈ F n m(n) . We call such an attack an f -attack since its purpose is to try to open s ∈ f −1 (y) for any y ∈ {0, 1} m(n) . To make the description easier, let us consider the case n = 1 resulting in table TÃ shown at Fig. 2 (this is almost identical to Fig.1 ). We have seen how (6) , the probability to succeed in unveiling s s.t. f 1 (s) = 0 and f 1 (s) = 1 satisfies
The quality of this f 1 -attack is given by (2) . That is, the attack succeed ifp 
The two others can be found similarly.
Remark that any element in TÃ belongs to exactly 4 attacks and that any attack uses exactly 4 elements in TÃ. This is what we mean when we say that all attacks in F n 1 covers TÃ uniformly. The construction can easily be generalized for arbitrary n. The number of rows of TÃ uses in any fattack (f ∈ F n m(n) ) is 2 m(n) and the number of columns is 2 m(n) 3 n−m(n) . That is, the number of elements in TÃ involved in such an f -attack is 4 m(n) 3 n−m(n) . As we shall see in Lemma 4, the covering remains uniform for all values of n.
D Proof of Lemma 4
Lemma 4 follows from the combinatorial lemma 5 below. To make the statement of this combinatorial lemma more succinct we first set the stage for it.
Let T be a 4 n lines by 3 n columns array. The lines are indexed by the 4 n strings (θ, b) ∈ {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n . The columns are indexed by the 3 n strings (τ, β) ∈ {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n such that β τ .
We now consider sub-arrays of T . Each sub-array will be composed of cells lying at the intersections of 2 m lines of T and 3 n−m 2 m columns of T . Any choice of the following 3n parameters will define a unique sub-array and different choices of parameters will define different sub-arrays:
subject to the condition 
E Sketch of Proof for Theorem 3
Protocol W n , which is almost identical to a QMC, is also a weak form of 1 − 2-OT. Theorem 2 tells us that any efficient adversaryÃ against W n must satisfy:
for some polynomial poly(n) wherep ok (n) is the probability to succeed in challenge c = 0 andε(n) is the maximum bias on
The only difference between W n and a QMC (as far asp ok (n) andε(n) are concerned) is that in W n , QMCs are made until challenge c = 1 has been reached. Letp abort,Wn be the probability for B to abort the execution of W n . Notice that there is no reason forÃ to changep ok (n) during the same execution of W n since the challenges are independent and random. We have,p
Let I n = {(I 0 , I 1 )|I 0 ∪ I 1 = {1, . . . , n}, I 0 ∩ I 1 = ∅} be the set of possible announcements forÃ in W n . Let I = (I 0 , I 1 ) ∈ I n be the set of positions announced byÃ's during an execution of W n . We define f I (b) as the 2-bit output function:
For s ∈ {0, 1} and b ∈ {0, 1} n , let h I (b, s) ≡ f I (b) [s] where f I (b) [s] denotes the s-th output bit of f I (b). Let QPoly(n) and QPoly(n,t) be the classes of families of polynomial-size quantum circuits in one and two variables respectively having one-bit output. Let C δ be the non-uniform class of all families of polynomial size circuits allowing to run W n with success probability at least 1 − δ. That is, any family {C n } n>0 ∈ C δ can be used to define the committing phase of an adversaryÃ = {(C n , ·)} n>0 against W n where C n allows forp abort,Wn ≤ δ given n is large enough. For simplicity, we abuse the notation by writing the output state of the committing phase on b θ as C n b θ although formally, C n is the circuit obtained by combiningÃ's and B's interactive circuits. Let G n be a quantum circuit with a one-bit output register so G n · (C n b θ ) defines a probability distribution over the possible outcomes for the measurement in the computational basis of G n 's output register. When we write out {G n · (C n b θ ) ⊗ θ } we are not only designating the value of G n 's output register but any classical mapping from the output into {0, 1}. Using this convention, Pr (h I (b, s) = out {G n · (C n b θ ) ⊗ θ }) ≥ 1 2 − , means that any classical mapping from the value of the output register to {0, 1} has expected probability of error at least Using (59), we get thatÃ also defines an adversary against QMC with p ok (n) ≥ 1 − 2δ. From (58), we conclude that
given the output of any family of poly-size quantum circuits {G n } n>0 ∈ QPoly(n). Remember thatε(n) is the maximum expected bias on h I (b, 0) ⊕ h I (b, 1) for any announcement I ∈ I n . The following lemma follows easily from Theorem 2:
Lemma 6.
(∀{C n } n>0 ∈ C δ )(∀I ∈ I n )(∃s ∈ {0, 1})(∀{G n } n>0 ∈ QPoly(n))(∀n > n 0 )
where the probability is taken over θ ∈ R {+, ×} n and b ∈ R {0, 1} n and whereε(n) is the function of δ and n defined in (60).
The proof of Lemma 6 is easy and omitted due to space limitations. It proceeds by contradiction showing that if both bits h I (b, 0) and h I (b, 1) can be guessed respectively by G 0 n and G 1 n with probability larger than 1−2ε(n) 10 thenÃ could attack a QMC with success probabilityp ok (n) ≥ 1 − 2δ and expected bias larger than 2δ + 1/poly(n)/2 contradicting (58).
Letp abort ( ) be the probability that B aborts the execution no later than during the -th call to W n in R-Reduce. Letp stop ( + 1) be the probability that given the first calls to W n were successful, B aborts during the + 1-th execution of W n . We have, 
In order forÃ's success probability 1 −p abort (t) to be non-negligible in t,p stop ( ) must be small for most executions ∈ [1 . . . t]. Let δ > 0 and α > 0 be two arbitrary constants. Assumingp stop ( ) > δ for all ∈ L with #L ≥ αt thenp abort (t) ≥ 1 − (1 − δ) αt . In other words, ifp stop ( ) > δ for a constant fraction of the t executions then 1 −p abort (t) is negligible in t. In general, an adversaryÃ against R-Reduce(t, W n ) is modeled by a family of quantum circuitsÃ = {(C n,t , G 0 n,t , G 1 n,t )} n,t>0 where C n runs the committing phase and circuits G 0 n and G 1 n extract information about b 0 and b 1 respectively. Promising adversaries in R-Reduce(t, W n ) are defined as follows: Definition 3. A polynomial size adversaryÃ = {(C n,t , G 0 n,t , G 1 n,t )} n,t>0 against R-Reduce(t, W n ) is promising ifp abort (t) ≤ 1− 
p(t) for some p(t) ∈ poly(t).
We now consider the limitations implied by (61) to any adversaryÃ against R-Reduce(t, W n ). Let b θ = ⊗ t i=1 b (i) θ (i) be the random n · t BB84 qubits picked and sent by B. The following lemma links promising adversaries against R-Reduce(t, W n ) to Lemma 6. It tells us that if
